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This thesis examines the origins, goals, and activities of the 
American Indian Movement (AIM). Such an examination disproves the 
common idea that AIM was a revolutionary organization. Many Indians, 
the media, and various agencies and members of the Federal government 
perceived and portrayed AIM as revolutionary and dangerous. The 
Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary went so far 
as to hold a hearing to determine the extent and direction of AIM's 
goals and activities. The subcommittee's chairman, James Eastland, 
believed and hoped to prove that AIM was inherently violent, had 
ties to communist organizations, advocated the overthrow of legitimate 
government forms, and posed a threat to society, in general. Moreover, 
this thesis contends that AIM's decline came about for a variety 
of reasons, not just the efforts of Eastland. Eastland's hearing 
constituted only the last blow to an already troubled organization.
AIM's origins can be found in the history of Federal Indian relations, 
the poor conditions in which most Indians lived, and the civil rights 
movement. To understand the nature of AIM's intentions, its 
development, goals, and activities are explored. AIM's origins and 
activities reveal neither designs for revolution nor an organizational 
reliance upon violence. Nevertheless, many groups, particularly 
the Eastland Subcommittee, perceived AIM as a dangerous and 
revolutionary organization. Negative perceptions of AIM were most 
often AIM's own fault. AIM had trouble gaining acceptance from 
reservation Indians, primarily, because AIM could not reconcile its 
brand of pan-Indianism with the strong bonds of tribalism.
Additionally, AIM did not understand the extent, complexity, and 
intent of tribal law. Combined with its tenuous relationship with 
the media, the above factors all contributed to AIM's demise. It 
was Eastland's findings, though, that signalled the end of AIM.
It is especially disheartening when, upon scrutinization, the hearing 
proved little, if anything, as to AIM's guilt as a revolutionary 
organization..
As an organization, AIM did not advocate violence, communism, or 
revolution. However, Eastland found otherwise. Eastland alone 
did not destroy AIM, but his efforts symbolized AIM's sruggle for 
recpgnition and acceptance and effectively marked the end of AIM 
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INTRODUCTION
A Senate Subcommittee, chaired by James Eastland of 
Mississippi, conducted hearings on the character and goals of the 
American Indian Movement in 1976. In his opening statement, 
Eastland stated that "the purpose of today's hearing is to 
establish whether their is, in fact, reason for believing that 
the American Indian Movement (AIM) is a radical subversive 
organization rather than an organization committed to improving 
the lot of the American Indians."1 As the hearings progressed, 
however, it became apparent that Eastland had- already made up his 
mind. Relying on only one source, a former FBI informant named 
Doug Durham, Eastland set out to prove that AIM was, indeed, a 
"radical Subversive organization."
In fact, the Subcommittee incorrectly labelled AIM as a
1U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Bnyolutionary Activities Within the United States: The American
•Indian Movement. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on 
Judici aryr 94th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 1.
1
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radical, subversive, and revolutionary organization. On the 
contrary, AIM's leadership represented peaceful goals and 
objectives. AIM hoped to secure rights and lands guaranteed 
various tribes by the myriad of treaties signed by 
representatives of the Federal government and tribal leaders.
AIM sought only to compel the government to enforce its treaty 
obligations - not to overthrow the government.
The first chapter presents background on the history of 
Federal-Indian relations and includes an examination of the 
treaties, laws, decisions, and attitudes that shaped federal 
Indian policy up to the I960's. In addition, it explores the 
conditions, status, and reactions of American Indians under 
government supervision. The government failed to devise an / 
efficient and acceptable policy for Indians which best served 
their economic, medical, and tribal needs and interests while 
preserving their dignity, hope, and culture. That failure led to 
inferior health conditions, economic uncertainty, loss of a 
viable land base, apathy, mistrust, and disgust. Those 
conditions opened the door for protest, assertion of 
constitutional rights, and demands for fulfillment of treaty 
obligations. AIM, along with other groups, rose out of the path 
°f despair and provided a voice for past frustrations and hopes 
for the future.
Chapter Two examines the founding, development, and purpose 
°f AIM. it explores the group's origins, goals, and activities, 
^cither AIM's goals nor its activities were particularly radical
3
or subversive. In fact, others had advanced most of AIM's goals 
long before its arrival, on the scene. AIM asserted treaty rights 
guaranteed respective tribes and worked to attain those rights. 
AIM's position inspired some of its followers to engage in 
criminal behavior. However, the national leadership never 
advocated overthrow of the Federal government or violence against 
anyone. AIM attacked racism, government neglect, and the 
exploitation of Indian lands, resources, and people. This 
chapter will also examine AIM's defense of itself against 
increasing opposition by the government.
Chapter Three examines AIM's relationship with reservation 
Indians and the media. AIM's leadership failed fully to 
comprehend the intricacies of Federal Indian law and the 
importance of tribal bonds. AIM also failed to realize to what 
extent it could use the media as a tool for its message. Both 
failures contributed greatly to AIM's demise and the government's 
perceptions of AIM.
Chapter Four explores the findings of the Subcommittee 
chaired by Eastland. Eastland claimed AIM was a revolutionary 
and violent organization with communist affiliations. However, 
the testimony provided during the hearing failed to support that 
conclusion. Arguments for AIM, if they would have been allowed, 
refute the Government's case. Eastland simply followed the FBI's 
Pattern of harassment and persecution of AIM. Finally, this 
chapter assesses the hearings contribution towards AIM's demise.
The Conclusion briefly describes AIM's demise and the
significance of the Eastland hearing to that demise. However, 
AIM had many internal problems that, hampered perpetuating the 
organization. Throughout its existence, AIM came under fire.
The U.S. government, media, and Indians all criticized AIM's 
goals, motives, and activities. Instead of using that criticism 
to its advantage, though, AIM pursued its own course. In doing 
so, it greatly offended some groups in the Federal government.
In response, the Federal government tarnished and damaged AIM's 
image, effectiveness, and possible contributions to creating 
politically, economically, and culturally stronger Indian 
communities.
CHAPTER ONE
American Indians have struggled to achieve self- 
determination and control of their futures for a long time. John 
Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the early 19th 
century, began the struggle when he declared in Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia that the "Indians are in a state of pupilage. Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian." He judged the Cherokee to be a "domestic dependent 
nation."1 Subsequent courts and policy makers decided that 
Indians were still learning and growing as a people and, thus, 
needed a helping hand. They needed to be taught and converted to 
the ways of civilization - particularly, white, American 
civilization. The Federal government, then, designed its policy
derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism, and American Law, 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 67.
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to foster dependency while attempting to educate and assimilate 
Indians into the white man's world. However, many Indians 
resisted efforts to compel assimilation. Through assimilation 
and absorption into white society, the Federal government hoped, 
eventually, to terminate wardship status and responsibility for 
Indians. Inefficient and undesired policies, though, provided 
few answers to the government's questions of how to satisfy 
Indians while relieving the government from its job as caretaker.
Congress declared an end to treaty-making in 1871 having 
signed hundreds of treaties with numerous tribes. The end of 
treaty-making clearly established two precedents. First, the 
government continued to violate existing treaty arrangements 
Second, the Federal government placed tribes on reservations and 
assumed responsibility and management of the reservations.
Indians were now subject to Congressional acts and executive 
orders. By the 20th century, the government implemented programs 
to speed assimilation. The government's one-sided policies 
contributed greatly to many Indians' refusal to assimilate for 
the next 100 years.
Congress passed the General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) in 
1887. Through the Act, Congress hoped to- instill an independent 
sPirit and proper (white, middle-class) values of property 
ownership by allotting each Indian head of family 160 acres. The 
Indian landholder received a trust patent where the U.S. held 
title to the land in trust for 25 years. Once the trust period 
onded, he received a fee patent and was also granted U.S.
7
citizenship.2 Problems arosef though. Allotted land was often 
arid and barren, many Indians knew nothing about farming or 
ranching, Indians had a difficult time obtaining credit to buy 
supplies, the government provided little instruction in farming 
techniques, and there was an inadequate supply of farm 
implements.3 Until 1904, the government purchased any surplus 
lands for sale after allotment (After 1904, tribes bought surplus 
lands) .4 Despite the Act's good intentions, many Indians and 
tribes lost millions of surplus acres since they had few means of 
holding onto the land and land sales proved essential for tribal 
survival in many cases.5
Congress enacted further legislation concerning land use in 
1891. It allowed individual Indians to lease their land for 
agricultural , grazing, mining, or logging purposes. The new 
legislation provided another way for Indians to support 
themselves. However, the government set low lease rates to 
encourage white settlements near reservations. Thus, in order
2Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, (Washington, 
D -C.: Government Printing Office, 1942, p. 258.
3Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 174.
4Tribal consent had been required for government purchases. 
Though tribes purchased surplus land after 1904, the case of Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) affirmed Congress' rights as guardian to 
Indians and Congress' right to do what it felt was right concerning 
Indian lands regardless of tribal consent [From David H. Getches, 
Daniel M. Rosenfelt, and Charles F. Wilkinson, Cases and Material 
^ILFederal Indian Law, (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1979),
P- 186.].
5Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, p. 174.
merely to survive, many Indians leased their lands and lost more 
control of their reservations.6
The early twentieth-century saw Indian leaders appeal to 
Congress for better protection of their rights and lands. In 
1906, Congress issued the Burke Act which prevented seizure of 
Indian lands for debt payment. However, the restriction applied 
only during a trust period determined by the President.7 
Additionally, the government granted full citizenship in 1924 to 
all Indians not covered by the Dawes Act.8 Citizenship, though, 
encouraged assimilation. Additionally, it failed to stop the 
flow of lands out of Indian hands or growing disenchantment with 
government policies. Increasingly, questions arose concerning 
allotment and the effectiveness of federal policies to provide a 
decent life for Indians.
The Brookings Institute issued The Problem of Indian 
Administration. also known as the Meriam Report, in 1928 in 
response to reformers' concerns for the problems in Indian 
country. The Report called for corporate management of tribal 
resources, strengthening of family and community life, and 
greater cooperation among government agencies. The Report's 
suggestions were well-received, especially among Indians, but the
6Ibid., p. 175.
7Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, (Washington,
•C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 80.
8Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, p. 177.
government took'no action for six years.9
Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934 
The Act incorporated many of the Brookings Institute's 
recommendations. The Act also recognized allotment as a failure 
quality of life for Indians remained low, millions of acres of 
Indian land had been taken, and the Indians failed to identify 
with the concept of private property. The IRA ended allotment, 
and allowed for communal ownership of lands. The Act also 
redefined the purpose of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and 
enabled tribes to draft new IRA constitutions.10
The BIA existed under various names and functions since 
1824. Under the IRA, the BIA administered the law and, thus, 
played a greater role in the day-to-day lives of Indians and 
established a clear line of supervision within the Bureau on the 
reservations.11 Corporate forms of government were established 
on reservations and in the structure of the BIA. The BIA 
appointed a supervisor for each reservation to act as a liaison 
and oversee the activities of the tribe. Tribal government 
consisted of a president or chairman and council to administer 
and manage tribal resources and needs. However, except for 
taxation of tribal members, arrest, courts, licenses and 
regulation of hunting and fishing, no act of tribal government 
could be executed and enforced without the expressed approval of
9Ibid., p. 180.
10Cohen, Handbook of federal Indian Law, p. 83-5.
u Ibid., p. 174-82.
still not allowed a free hand in managing their lives or 
resources.
Indian leaders continued to call for reforms despite passage 
of the IRA. Tribal leaders founded the National Congress of 
American Indians (NCAI) in 194 4 to act as an advocate for the 
benefit of all tribes. The NCAI chose the problem of land 
retention as its paramount concern. A continuing loss of control 
over tribal lands pushed each successive generation into.further 
dependence upon friends, family or government. Less land also 
meant less agricultural output for Indians. Simply put, the 
shrinking land base of many tribes combined with rising 
populations made it difficult to survive. Unable to support 
themselves, many Indians left the reservations to find work. The
lack of a viable land base and the increasing number of Indians 
leaving the reservations provided the government with a golden 
°PPortunity to achieve termination.
Congress established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. 
The Commission reviewed cases of Indian lands taken under 
Questionable circumstances and passed judgement on whether those 
lands should be returned.13 Karl Mundt, Senator from South 
Dakota and supporter of the Commission, stated that "if any 
*nciian tribe can prove it has been unfairly and dishonorably
12Robert Burnette and John Koster, The Road to Wounded Knee, 
(New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1974), p. 2 97. See Appendix A for
a flow chart of tribal government and the BIA.
13Berkhofer, p. 188-189.
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dealt with by the United States it is entitled to recover, This 
ought to be an example for all the world to follow in its 
treatment of minorities."14 The Commission appeared to fulfill 
many Indians' desires. However, the Commission returned no 
land - only money. In fact, many Congressmen proposed 
termination of those tribes whose land base and population deemed 
them least fit to survive. Though no dates were set, eventually, 
all federal responsibility and supervision of Indians and 
reservations, in particular, would end. Congress perceived the 
Commission as a means to clear up grievances prior to 
termination.15
Four major measures continued the termination process in the 
1950's. House Concurrent Resolution 108, in 1953, advocated an 
end to Indians' "status as wards of the United States." It 
called for a reexamination of treaties, existing legislation 
concerning Indians, and abolishing BIA offices and services in 
California, Florida, New York, and Texas.16 Congress terminated 
six tribes from federal wardship in the next session, and 
eventually, a total of twelve tribes were terminated.17 
Resolution 108 advanced freedom from federal supervision for
14Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died For Your Sins, (New York: 
Avon Books, 1969), p. 58.
15Berkhofer, p. 188.
16House Concurrent Resolution 108 (1953), U.S. Statutes at




Indians, buty in reality, it sought only to achieve the end of 
government responsibility . Most of the terminated tribes could 
not survive without federal aid and lost their land, culture, and, 
hope.
Public Law 280, also passed in 1953, granted the state 
governments of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions committed 
by or against Indians.18 Prior to Public Law 280, Federal and 
tribal courts maintained jurisdiction over all cases involving 
Indians. Public Law 280 paved the way for termination in the 
above states by removing the Federal government and tribes from 
the judicial process and erasing a critical link in Federal - 
Indian relations (Most states returned to tribal and Federal 
authority, eventually. However, at the time, Public Law 280 was 
very important to termination efforts*).
Congress repealed the law prohibiting the sale of alcohol to 
!ndians in 1953, also. Repeal of the law granted greater 
freedom, but alcoholism and its accompanying consequences - 
unemployment, suicide, high instances of infectious disease, 
death - had long been a problem for Indians. The government 
chose to disregard dire social and health problems in the guise 
°f greater freedom. This measure served only to intensify the 
alcohol problem faced by many Indians and helped establish a 
flourishing liquor trade on the edges of reservations (Each tribe
18Public Law 280, U.S. Statutes at Large. Vol. 67, (Washington, 
Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 588-590.
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decides whether or not to allow the sale of alcohol within the 
borders of its reservation.) . -1
Finally, Congress transferred all Indian health programs 
from the BIA to the Public Health Service in 1954. The measure 
reduced the services and responsibilities of the BIA and set the 
tone for removing others services from the administration of the 
BIA. By lumping. Indians' health concerns with those of everyone 
else, Congress wanted to end duplication of services. The 
result, though, forced tribes to deal with yet another federal 
agency, denied their unique relationship with the federal 
government, and denied recognition of special health problems 
(alcoholism, tuberculosis, cirrhosis).19
The government's ultimate goal in the 1950's was termination 
of federal responsibility for Indians. Congress hoped to 
eliminate both the Indians' dependence on the government and 
their unique status. All termination measures advanced greater 
individual freedom and responsibility for Indians but failed to 
recognize that most Indians had no alternatives in which to exert 
those new freedoms. Lack of employment opportunities, reduced 
services and aid, and uncertainty forced many Indians to leave 
the reservations - yet another goal of termination. The 
termination policies of the 1950's produced an exodus from 
reservations, worsened health and employment conditions on and 
the reservations, and fostered a growing resentment by 




Organized groups of Indians formed in the 1960's to tackle 
the problems they all faced. Taking their lead from the civil 
rights movement, those groups demanded their rights. Many tribes 
asserted hunting and fishing rights long denied them by state and 
Federal government.20 Other groups and tribes demanded better 
living conditions on the reservations. The most outspoken group 
of this time, the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) formed in 
1961 as an alternative to the more conservative NCAI. The NIYC 
perceived the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) as too 
conservative and too subservient to government interests in order 
to maintain power in the Indian community. The NIYC advocated 
treaty rights and return of lost lands. However, because of its 
unwillingness to compromise, the NIYC achieved little, if any 
material gains.21 Despite its lack of concrete achievements, 
though, the NIYC contributed new and different avenues for Indian 
indignation and protest.
The American Indian Chicago Conference brought together 
Indians from many tribes in June 1961 to discuss problems and 
solutions common to all Indians. The Conference issued the 
^oclaration of Indian Purpose which made a number of 
recommendations: return of former reservation lands, protection
water rights, reappropriation of lost funds to enlarge 
Reservation land bases, and greater control in deciding how
20Burnette and Koster, p. 24.
21Ibid., p. 26.
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Indians would be governed. The most important proviso requested 
that the government respect arid keep its treaty obligations.22 
Despite its honest and simple approach, though, Congress largely 
ignored the Declaration. However, it provided a blueprint for 
future demands upon the BIA and Congress by Indian groups.
Inefficiency, confusion, and incompetence by the government 
continued in the I960's. President Lyndon Johnson's Great 
Society created more funds and opportunities for Indians, but it 
also increased the red tape. Though freed from BIA supervision, 
tribes now had to deal with numerous federal agencies (Office of 
Economic Opportunity, Labor Department, Federal Housing 
Authority, Economic Development Administration) instead of just 
the BIA. Separate applications and files had to be filled out 
for each agency.23 More funds were available, but the 
bureaucracy made it more difficult to obtain. Federal 
appropriations to Indians (including money from the Public Health 
Service for Indian health and antipoverty programs through the 
Office of Economic Opportunity) totalled 460 million dollars in 
1968, or approximately $5,600 per reservation family if paid 
directly. Actual average family income, though, was $1, 500 .24 
Also, Federally-sponsored education and health programs imposed 
white, middle-class values on Indians while ignoring and
22Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed. The Indian and the White Man, Garden 
City, NY: Anchor Books, 1964, p. 400-404.
23Deloria, Custer Died For Your Sins, p. 140-141.
. 24Ralph Nader, "Lo, the Poor Indian," New Republic, March 30,
1968, p. 14-15,
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degrading Indian history, culture, and heritage.
Indians attributed many of their problems to the loss of 
their land base and, consequently, their independence. 
Partitioning of land, invalidation of wills, forced sales, 
manipulation by government agents, and appointment of 
conservators were conducted under the authority of the BIA.25 
Thus, distrust of the government and its practices deepened the 
disgust and despair of Indians.
Rampant poverty, illiteracy, and high mortality and disease 
rates on reservations demanded attention by the late 1960's. 
Government figures revealed that in all areas of life Indians 
compared negatively with the general population. Unemployment 
among Indians reached 40% compared to a national average of 
3.6%.26 Indians could expect to live only two-thirds as long as 
whites.27 The rate of illiteracy (30%) and school dropout rate 
(42%) were twice the national average.28 Infant mortality for
25Edgar S. Cahn and David W. Hearne, eds., Our Brothers Keeper: 
5i§L_Indian in White America, (New York: New Community Press,
^  p. 35-74.
26U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office 
Special Concerns, A Study of Selected Socio-Economic 
•̂ l̂ £acteristics of Ethnic Minorities Based on the 1970 , Census, 
III: American Indians, (Washington, D.C.: Government
Minting Office, 1974), p. 49-51.
27Ibid. , p. 22.
s 28U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
•^^Listics Concerning Indian Education, Fiscal Year 1970, p . 1.
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Indian babies was ten points higher than the national level.29 • 
Indians.had higher than normal rates of tuberculosis, alcoholism, 
death by accident, and suicide.30 Thirty-eight percent of 
Indians lived below the poverty line compared to approximately 
14% of the larger population.31 Finally, Indians had lost 90 
million acres since. 1897 .32
Congressional committees and Presidential task forces 
investigated the myriad of problems faced by Indians in the late 
I960's. Causes were rooted out and suggestions made, but the 
government implemented few noticeable changes. Many committee 
members failed to understand the Indians, their culture, their 
relationship with the federal government or the extent of federal 
supervision. Two examples demonstrated the confusion and lack of 
understanding between the government and the Indians. First, 
Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968. The first 
seven of the ten "rights" granted were taken directly from the 
Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution. The Bill recognized 
tribes as possessing the powers of self-government with those 
Powers subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.33 The
29U .S ., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public 
health Service, Indian Health Trends and Services, 1970 Edition, p. 14. " ------------------------------------ ---------------
30Ibid., p. 23.
31A Study of Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics, p. 68.
32Nader, p. 14-15.
~ 33Public Law 90-284, Title II,. "The Rights of Indians," U.S. 
pj^tutes at T.arge. Vol. 82, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Uffice), 1968, p. 77-78.
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recognition of specific rights for Indians already granted all 
citizens, plus the powers of tribal self-rule, affirmed Indians 
and tribes as distinct,and separate, but, at the same time, 
pointed to the government's failure to protect those rights in 
the past. Second, a Special Subcommittee hearing on Indian 
education finally determined Indians' true desires. Committee 
chairman Edward Kennedy, responding to John Belindo, executive 
director of NCAI, queried, "Summarizing your testimony . . . the
fact that the common complaint is that the Indians are not 
playing the role of determining their own destiny, whether it is 
education, jobs, whatever it might be. They are not playing the 
role that they feel they should be playing. Rather than just a 
demand for more money or more programs, it is really a change in 
attitude on the part of the Federal Government that is 
needed."34 The question had been asked before, but this time 
many Indians would not take no for an answer.
Congressional members proposed changes, but none of 
significance came to fruition. Indians could wait no longer.
They had tired of idle talk and unfulfilled promises. Taking 
their lead from the civil rights struggle and the NCAI and NIYC, 
groups formed and acted out their disgust with Federal policies,
0r the lack thereof. The Declaration of Indian Purpose provided 
a framework of goals and ideas for the new groups. Some, like
w 34U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public 
^ifare, Indian Education, hearings before a special subcommittee 
^— ^he Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Congress, 1st 
lor Sessions, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 
p. 223.
the American Indian Movement, spawned local movements, while 
others jumped into the national spotlight by seizing and 
demanding title to Alcatraz Island.35 These new groups would 
lead the charge in demanding changes be made in Federal-Indian 
relations. The American Indian Movement emerged as the most 
visible group to rise to the challenge.
M 35"Indian Group Stakes a Claim to Alcatraz," New York Times 
November 21, 1969, p. 49.
CHAPTER TWO
Dennis Banks, Clyde Bellecourt, and George Mitchell, all 
Chippewa from Minnesota, founded the American Indian 
Movement (AIM) on July 28, 1968 in Minneapolis.1 Banks and 
Bellecourt had worked together on a Minneapolis anti-poverty 
program. Mitchell was a social welfare worker in Minneapolis.2 
Banks and Bellecourt both claimed to have made a commitment to 
Indian rights during prison or jail terms. Many of AIM's leaders 
had trouble with the law in their youth. However, they moved on 
to successful careers with a greater commitment to helping 
Indians, and primarily urban Indians.3 They organized AIM to 
address the problems faced by Indians in an urban environment. 
Racism and poverty created grave problems for urban Indians for 
which they were ill-prepared to deal. AIM operated as a
Di lFay G. Cohen, The Indian Patrol in Minneapolis# Ph.D. 
ssertation, University of Minnesota, 1973, p. 44.
of *. î ° H and Dewing, Wounded Knee: The Meaning and Significance
•̂ -lilgL Second Incident, (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1985), p.
3Ibid., p. 45-48.
"reformist social-action group" that also contained elements, of a 
social club and mutual aid society.4 It sought to help urban 
Indians find jobs, housing, and solace.
The group drew up a list of objectives in mid-August 1968. 
The main objective was "to solicit and broaden opportunities for 
the urban Indian in order that he may enjoy his full rights as a 
citizen of these United States."5 At that point, AIM sought to 
help Indians on an individual basis. They enumerated other 
short- and long-term objectives. Short-range goals emphasized ' 
programs for better housing, education, employment opportunities, 
and improving communication between Indians and the greater 
community in which they lived. Long-range goals stressed greater 
unification among Indian people.6 AIM's founders envisioned 
unification as breaking down barriers between tribes and 
creating a pan-Indianism. The last objective played the greatest 
role in AIM's growth on the national scene and produced some of 
its greatest obstacles.
AIM centers arose in Milwaukee, Denver, Cleveland, Seattle 
with other cities following throughout 1969 and 1970. A loose 
national leadership existed as an informal group without much 
attention to titles, positions, or proscribed lines of command 
^his, of course, contributes to difficulty in assigning
4Cohen, Indian Patrol, p. 48.
5Ibid., p. 47.
6lbid., p. 47. For a complete list of objectives see Appendix
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responsibility to AIM's leadership for certain actions and 
defining exactly who was the leadership.), but each center 
functioned independently and addressed the particular needs of 
Indians in that city. The national organization acted as a 
clearinghouse for information. Centers were apprised of those 
programs and methods that worked best. Under this umbrella and 
in the urban context, AIM functioned quite well.7
As it got under way, one of AIM's more successful programs 
was the Indian Patrol in Minneapolis. The Indian Patrol acted as 
a liaison between Indians and city police in an effort to improve 
relations and attitudes between the two groups. Indians suffered 
an unusually high number of drinking-related arrests and the 
Patrol worked to reduce that number. Patrol members met the 
police at the point of arrest and convinced them to release the 
Indian into their custody. After a shaky start, a working 
relationship between the Patrol and police developed. Indian 
arrests in Minneapolis dropped markedly with few accompanying 
Problems. For a short time, things went smoothly.8
However, the Indian Patrol accused police of unwarranted 
arrests in the spring of 1969 and the relationship quickly 
soured. After AIM's accusations of police brutality against 
•*-ndians in March, the police grew to distrust the Patrol and
j. 7Rachel A. Bonney, "The Role of AIM Leaders in Indian 
ationalism, " American Indian Quarterly, Fall 1977, p. 219.
8Cohen, Indian Patrol, p. 56-7.
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AIM.9
AIM's- many urban community centers became the focus for 
increasing activism after 1969. They served as meeting places 
for young Indians dissatisfied with the lack of opportunities 
offered them in the cities. AIM-and its followers increasingly 
voiced frustration with the Federal agencies that provided them 
with funding. Eventually, they came to see the Federal 
government as the source of urban Indians' troubles. Past 
government policies had pushed Indians off reservations and into 
a world they did not understand and which rejected them. In this 
urban environment, Indians faced racism, slums, competition for 
jobs, and the loss of their culture. AIM believed the Federal 
government should be held accountable for its actions,
Particularly towards urban Indians. AIM and its followers 
directed protests at the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).10
No programs or services for urban Indians existed under the 
auspices of the BIA. The BIA's responsibility and authority for 
Indians ended at the borders of the reservation. It operated on 
the assumption that Indians left the reservation for jobs and, 
thus, did not need BIA assistance. In reality, jobs for Indians 
w^re scarce both on and off the reservation. By 1970, one-third 
°t Americans Indians lived in cities.11 AIM believed the BIA
9Ibid., p. 70-72 and 205.
, 10Alvin M. Josephy M., Now That the Buffalo's Gone, (New York: 
red A. Knopf, 1982), p. 230.
s 11,fThe Story of the Indians,” New York Times, July 12, 1970,
ection 4, p. 3.
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had a responsibility to those urban Indians. Towards that end, 
AIM occupied the BIA's Minneapolis office for four days in March 
of 1970 to dramatize the plight of urban Indians and to demand 
change. No serious charges were brought against AIM members, but 
AIM had taken a decisive step towards its future.12 Foretelling 
future contradictions and conflicts, AIM failed to realize that 
demanding change from the BIA continued dependence upon the BIA 
at a time when AIM, itself, asked for greater freedom and 
sovereignty for Indians.
A further glimpse into AIM's future came on November 20,
1969. On that day, a group calling itself Indians of All Tribes 
seized Alcatraz Island, reclaimed it as the property of all 
Indians, and announced plans for a center of Native American 
studies. They demanded the Federal government cede them title to 
the island and help fund the center.13 Though eventually
unsuccessful in its demands, the occupation of Alcatraz remained
a burr in the government's side for 18 months and inspired AIM 
and other groups to similar seizures.
AIM learned two things from the seizure of Alcatraz: the
Value of direct confrontation as a method of protest and the 
extent to which it may be used successfully. Upon first seizing 
Alcatraz, the Indians invoked a little-known law that authorized 
Secretary of War to establish schools for any Indians holding
12Cohen, Indian Patrol, p. 198.
v. 13mIndian Group Stakes a Claim to Alcatraz," New York Times,
Nov- 21, 1969, p. 49.
"educational treaty claims on surplus Federal lands (some 
treaties required the Federal government to provide educations to 
the Indians in question) .,rl4 Though the Indians of All Tribes, 
the group which claimed responsibility for the occupation, 
represented no tribe in particular, the law provided them with a 
legal foothold from which to begin negotiations. Out of concern 
for the safety of those involved, the government proceeded 
slowly. Finally, the Indians garnered public support by invoking 
legal justifications for their actions and by the large number 
(estimated as many as 1,000 people in early stage) of Indians who 
went to Alcatraz during the seizure. Using the media to get its 
message out, AIM employed many of the same methods and strategy 
over the next five years to gain attention and support for its 
objectives.
A rising tide of dissatisfaction among Indians moved 
President Richard Nixon to address the myriad of problems faced 
by all Indians. Before a joint session of Congress on July 8, 
!970, Nixon stated what most Indians already knew - "The first 
^ericans - the’Indians - are the most deprived and most isolated 
minority group in our nation." He said, "On virtually every 
Scale of measurement - employment, income, education, health - 
^be condition of the Indian people ranks at the bottom."15 He 
Resented an agenda for changes in services to Indians and the
k 14Chap. 363, U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 22, (Washington, 
*C. : Government Printing Office, 1883), p. 181.
T. 15,,Excerpts From Nixon's Message on Indian Affairs," New York 
■̂-iUies, July 9, 1970, p. 18.
extent of Federal authority'over tribes. He proposed, giving more 
operational control of aid programs to Indians through the 
establishment of tribal boards of education, the appropriation of 
more money for economic development and health programs, and the 
expansion of urban help centers.16 Except for the last item, 
all of Nixon's proposals were aimed at the reservations. Urban 
Indians felt ignored once again. Despite Nixon's promises, very 
little legislation was passed helping any Indians. Nixon's 
failed attempts in Congress and the persistence of problems for 
urban Indians sparked AIM to action.
Various groups of Indians attempted either to seize surplus 
Federal property or to occupy BIA offices in 1970 and 1971.
AIM's chapters adopted both tactics. The reasons and objectives 
of each group determined the form of protest. The intent of 
those seizing government property was to take back formerly 
Indian territory or make redress for previously seized lands. 
Those protesters usually seized, or attempted to seize, military 
lnstallations declared surplus or no longer in use, such as 
abandoned missile sites or military bases. However done, the 
Indians invoked educational clauses in treaties and requested 
title to the land. Such seizures took place in Seattle, 
Minneapolis, Milwaukee, and, more unusual, M t . Rushmore.17
The takeovers were peaceful and resulted in arrests for most
_ 16James N. Naughton, "President Urges Wider Indian Role in Aid 
°r Tribes," New York Times, July 9, 1070. p. 1.
17Josephy, Now That the Buffalo's Gone, p. 230.
of the participants.18 However., one- group succeeded. AIM 
members in Milwaukee seized an abandoned Coast Guard station in 
August 1971. For whatever reason, they were not removed. In 
fact, a year later, AIM remained there, had established a halfway 
house for recovering alcoholics along with a community school and 
had successfully negotiated for the title to the land.19
Although rare, the episode demonstrated two significant 
points. First, individual AIM centeris acted independently of any 
national leadership, but they followed similar tactics and 
objectives. In this instance, the Milwaukee AIM chapter, on its 
own, sought redress for lands taken in Wisconsin; the national 
leadership had not made a universal call to action. Second, the 
Federal government did not, at this time, view AIM as a dangerous 
or violent organization. Most likely, the government would not 
have granted title to the land had they regarded AIM, nationally 
°r even the Milwaukee chapter, as revolutionary.
Many AIM chapters chose to occupy BIA offices as their 
method of protest. Protesters demonstrated against BIA rule 
usually by sitting in the lobbies of Bureau offices and 
Preventing business as usual - much like civil rights and 
student protesters before them. Occupations or sit-ins took 
Place in Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, Philadelphia, Cleveland, 
Albuquerque, Los Angeles, and Alameda, California. AIM neither 
—
18Ibid., p. 230 .
19"Indians Mark Land Seizure in Milwaukee, New York Times, Aug.
20- 1972, p.' 44. --------------
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organized nor conducted all of these occupations, but many 
members participated. Once again, the demonstrations remained 
peaceful and most of those arrested were later released.20 
These demonstrations, thouqh, brought AIM onto the national 
scene. Takeovers and occupations garnered media exposure and, 
thus, a wider audience. The protests also brought new faces to 
the attention of AIM's national organization. Russell Means, 
Carter Camp, and Leonard Peltier, representing a more radical 
direction in tactics and rhetoric,.rose to prominence nationally 
in AIM through their efforts in local demonstrations. AIM's 
higher profile and new leaders sparked the growth and development 
of the national organization.
AIM's new focus became clear Thanksgiving Day of 1970.
Russell Means and other AIM members buried Plymouth Rock with 
sand and boarded the Mayflower II on that day. On the Mayflower 
Means demanded "Listen. Listen to us, white men. Plymouth 
Rock is red. Red with our blood. The white men came here for 
religious freedom and he has denied it to us. Today you will see 
the Indian reclaim the Mayflower in a symbolic gesture to reclaim 
0ur rights in this country."21 Those words thrust Means and AIM 
lnto the national spotlight. Means' assumption of authority to 
sPeak for AIM and Indians, in general, contributed to the media's 
^sperception of AIM as a unified whole and chief vehicle for
20Josephy, p. 230.
21"Mourning Indians Dump Sand on Plymouth Rock, " New York 
-iSles, Nov. 27, 1970, p. 26.
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Indian activists. In reality, AIM never abandoned its philosophy 
that each center should determine its own course of action. 
However, AIM created a more unified and defined national 
leadership centered around Means, Banks, and Vernon and Clyde 
Bellecourt that formulated AIM's goals over the next two years.
The next two years saw continued occupations of BIA offices 
and land seizures. AIM increased the stakes on September 22,
1971, when members of AIM and the National Indian Youth Council 
(NIYC) barged into the BIA offices in Washington, D.C. They 
demanded to see the BIA Director of Education, Wilma Victor, to 
discuss what they considered her lack of understanding and 
sympathy for the problems of Indian education. Police arrested 
the group when they refused to leave. Later, though, the 
government dropped the charges and paid the Indians' way home.22 
The government seemed to believe that they could make the 
questions and demands go away; however, AIM was not that easily
^sterred•
Officials in the White House and Department -of Interior 
c°ntinued to submit legislation along lines proposed by Nixon in 
*970 throughout 1971 and 1972. However, Congress passed none of 
the proposed legislation for revamping the BIA and the existing 
Mature of Indian relations with the Federal government. AIM 





Seized in Capital Clash, New
BIA had one employee for every 30 reservation Indians by 
1973) ,23
The Trail of Broken Treaties march in 1972 addressed the 
problems left unanswered by Congress. More conservative, non-AIM 
activists such as Robert Burnette (former and later a tribal 
chairman at Rosebud (S.D.) Reservation), Hank Adams, and Sid 
Mills conceived the Trail of Broken Treaties as a cross-country 
caravan by Indians to Washington, D.C. Once there, the Indians 
presented a set of demands or ”20 points" that they wanted the 
White House to address concerning the problems of Indians.24 
AIM leader Vernon Bellecourt stated the goal of the Trail caravan 
was to "remind elected officials of the common mistreatment and 
neglect of the American Indian."25
The "20 points" included provisions concerning redress of 
Past grievances, resumption of treaty-making, water rights, 
Volition of the BIA, and improved social, economic, and health 
conditions. Eight Indian organizations participated in planning 
the caravan and drawing up the proposals. Four other groups 
endorsed the concepts and purpose of the caravan.26 Those
23"Real Goals of the Restless Indians, " U.S. News and World 
£££ort, April 2, 1973, p. 27.
, 24B.I.A. I'm Not Your Indian Anymore, (Rooseveltown, NY:
Akwesasne Notes, 1973), p. 2.
25"Indians to Drive to Capital," New York Times, Oct. 5, 1972,p. 95>
>. 26The eight groups involved in the planning were the National 
J^ian Brotherhood (of Canada), Native American Rights Fund,
> erican Indian Movement, National Indian Youth Council, Native 
erican Indian Council, National Council on Indian Work, National
31
.twelve organizations represented over 80 tribes; their goals and 
methods of change ranged from conservatism to militancy.
Burnette admitted to differences, but all factions agreed that 
economic and other pressures threatened to destroy Indian 
culture.27 The caravan hoped to halt that process.
Caravans left from. Los Angeles and Seattle. Along the way, 
the caravans stopped in reservations long enough to spread their 
ideas and gather more followers. A third caravan embarked from 
Denver. The organizers planned for the caravans to reach 
Washington the week before the 1972 Presidential election. They 
would present their demands before a national audience and wait 
for the government's response. The caravan's organizers felt the 
timing would force President Nixon to address their demands 
immediately. However, upon reaching Washington, the situation 
changed rapidly.
Arrangements had been made with church and religious groups 
to provide lodging for the Indians upon their reaching the 
CaPital. However, for some unknown reason, the churches withdrew 
their offers upon the Indians' arrival. This left the Indians 
Wlth shut -up, rat-infested buildings with no plumbing provided by
^-dian Leadership Training, and the American Indian Commission on 
j^hol and Drub Abuse. The groups lending endorsement were the 
tive American Women's Action Council, United Native Americans, 
Cn Indian Lutheran Board, and the Coalition of Indian-
trolled School Boards.
-p. 27Wiliiam Blair, "Indians to Begin Capital Protests, " New York 
Oct. 31, 1972, p. 31.
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the government.28 Amid claims of government pressure on the- 
churches to rescind their invitations, the protesters marched on 
the BIA offices building on November 2. More than 500 Indians 
seized the building demanding better lodging and that attention 
be given to the ”20 points." AIM supported this bold move and 
helped lead it, but they were not alone. When BIA officials 
refused to help, the Indians took control of the building.29 
The following day, November 3, Louis Bruce, an Oglala from Pine 
Ridge (S.D.) Reservation and Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
visited the building. By now, the Indians refused to leave until 
the government established a White House task force to make 
recommendations to the President based on the "20 points."' In 
support, Bruce said, "I'm willing to stick it out to assist 
you."30 Such remarks eventually cost Bruce his job. Organizers 
claimed they represented 250 of the nation's 300 tribes, but AIM 
assumed control of the situation. AIM spokesman Dennis Banks 
stated, "We are trying to bring about some meaningful change."31 
The Indians' position stiffened as the Army refused to let 
caravan members visit Arlington Cemetery for spiritual services 
honoring Indian war dead on the grounds that the caravan was a
28Mary Crow Dog and Richard Erdoes, Lakota Woman, (New York: 
Grove Weidenfeld, 1990), p. 86.
29William Blair, "500 Indians Seize U.S. Building after Scuffle 
with Capital Police," New York Times, Nov. 3, 1972, p. 1.
v 30William Blair, "Indians in Capital Defy a Court Order," New




With AIM's leaders in the forefront, the Indians demanded 
negotiations before they would leave. Negotiations went on for 4 
days before an agreement was reached. White House negotiators 
agreed to name a Federal study group to make recommendations to 
Nixon .concerning the "20 points" by June 1, 1973 .33 As part of
the settlement, negotiators recommended against prosecution and 
the Indians were granted $60,000 to cover travel expenses home.
On their way out of the building, Indians took what they called 
"incriminating" documents from BIA files. The BIA later demanded 
the documents' return, but, at the time, police made no effort to 
stop the Indians.34
The government estimated damage to the building at one 
Million dollars. During the occupation, files had been emptied, 
chairs and desks smashed, and graffiti painted on the walls, 
damage was extensive, particularly to the accumulated documents 
from years of BIA administration.35 The only reason for the 
destruction appeared to be frustration with an unresponsive 
government and an overbearing bureaucracy. Martha Gras, a 71- 
year old Pawnee involved in the occupation, summed up the general
32Ibid., p. 42.
33William Blair, "Militant Indians Agree to Leave," New York 
Nov. 8, 1972, p. 49.
R . 34William Blair, "Indians Take Files as They Leave U.S.
Dflding, " New York Times, Nov. 9, 1972, p. 52.
rp. 35Wiliiam Blair, "Indians Ripped Up Federal Building," New York 
Nov. 10, 1972, p. 17.
34
mood, "There are nothing but crooks and liars, up here. TheyMl 
steal you blind."36
The American Indian Movement received much of the blame for 
the BIA occupation. AIM's leaders were at the forefront of 
negotiations and acted as spokesmen for the many groups.
However, the original eight groups who had organized the caravan 
participated also. AIM's avid support of militancy led outsiders 
to believe that AIM alone wanted and controlled the occupation.' 
Those attitudes toward and media images of AIM spread throughout 
Indian country. -Many reservation Indians saw the "20 points" as 
AIM's points. Focusing on the destruction to the building, 
conservative reservation Indians became guarded towards AIM. As 
a result, AIM's association with the BIA occupation and the "20 
points" increased tensions between AIM and the reservations; The 
FBI listed AIM members as "key extremists" which caused further 
aPprehension towards AIM.37
AIM did not produce the "20 points' on its own, but AIM did 
become their most vocal advocates, particularly on those points 
concerning treaty rights. Many Indians, particularly those on 
reservations, did not appreciate AIM's efforts, though.
Suggesting the abolition of the BIA and Federal relations based 
0n treaties frightened many Indians. Problems existed within the 
but Indians had known nothing else. In its own peculiar
3€William Blair, "500 Indians Seize U.S. Building after Scuffle 
lth Capital Police," New York Times, Nov. 3, 1972, p. 1.
y. 37Peter Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, (New York: 
1]ting Press, 1983), p. 56.
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way, the BIA upheld treaty rights by enforcing tribal 
constitutions based on past legislation.38 In addition, AIM's 
membership and leadership, in particular, drew almost exclusively 
from urban Indians. Reservation Indians resented being told who 
and what to believe by a group of outsiders. Moving on to the 
reservations in 1973 and after, AIM increasingly encountered 
opposition from Indians who claimed that AIM did not understand 
tribal sovereignty or the bonds of tribalism. AIM's lack of 
contact with and knowledge of tribal ties and the group's 
ignorance of the legal extent of tribal sovereignty became 
painfully clear at Wounded Knee, South Dakota in February 1973.
AIM began its move to the reservations during the Trail of 
Broken Treaties. Young Indians weary of the poverty and 
direction-less life on the reservation found appeal in AIM's 
objectives. AIM advanced pride and assertiveness - qualities 
that had been lacking in many reservation communities. Taking 
charge of one's life had great appeal. In addition, as one 
Young Sioux AIM member recalled, "...you can't live off the deeds 
°f Sitting Bull or Crazy Horse. You can't wear their eagle 
foathers, freeload off their legends. You have to make your own 
ê9ends now."39 AIM provided those young Indians with direction
38pahn and Hearne, Our Brother's Keeper: The Indian in White
The Pine Ridge Sioux Indian Reservation in South Dakota
ca, p. 14.
39Crow Dog and Erdoes, Lakota Woman, p. 11.
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became the focus of AIM's move to .the reservations for several 
reasons. First,. Russell Means came originally from Pine Ridge. 
Second, because of Means' association with the area, AIM leaders 
had been to South Dakota to participate in traditional Sioux 
ceremonies seeking their own sense -of Indianism. Third, in 
March of 1972, Raymond Yellow Thunder had been found dead in 
nearby Gordon, Nebraska. Yellow Thunder was found in the trunk 
of a car having died from internal injuries. Just days before he 
was found, Yellow Thunder had been stripped from the waist down 
and thrown into the middle of a dance at the American Legion 
hall.40 Yellow Thunder's case received worldwide media coverage 
due to the light sentence of manslaughter given the perpetrators. 
AIM went to Nebraska seeking justice. They declared that much of 
the problem stemmed from the overwhelming racism of whites in the 
area. Shortly after the incident, Indians at Pine Ridge invited 
AIM to participate in a discussion panel concerning 
discrimination and brutality in the area.41 Thereafter, AIM 
became a recurring fixture at Pine Ridge. Fourth, as Indians 
came to regard South Dakota as the "Mississippi of the North," 
the national leadership centered more of its activities there.
In February 1973, a white man stood trial for killing an 
*ndian, Wesley Bad Heart Bull, in Custer, South Dakota. AIM and
40,,Death of Indian Sparks Protest," New York Times, March 8, 1972, p. 37. “
rp. 41"Indians to Meet in Dakota to Discuss Bias Charges," New York 
■Piffles, March 12, 1972, p. 27.
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its followers descended on Custer to demand a more serious charge 
than that of manslaughter brought by the state. As Means and 
Banks tried to negotiate inside the courthouse, an angry mob led 
by Bad Heart Bull's mother engaged in a shouting and shoving 
match with state police. The situation escalated quickly into a 
riot during which the Chamber of Commerce building burned to the 
ground.42 State police brought the situation under control late 
in the day, but fears among whites, of AIM greatly increased. 
Because they had organized the protest, AIM had to assume some 
responsibility for the violence. However, AIM's leaders had not 
gone to Custer advocating violence. Because they had organized 
the protest, though, they were also seen as the instigators.43
Also, during early 1973, Pine Ridge experienced troubles 
with its elected tribal council and president, Dick Wilson. Some 
members of the tribal council called for Wilson's impeachment on 
charges of misuse of tribal funds, nepotism, failure to hold 
meetings, operating without a budget.44 Wilson survived the 
impeachment, but tensions remained. Wilson symbolized many 
divisions within the reservation: half-bloods versus full-
bloods, ;the power and centrality of Pine Ridge village over the 
0lJtlying districts, and those who supported AIM and those who did 
n°t. Wilson strongly opposed AIM. Citing the fear created by
42,,22 Dakota Indians Seized after Clash with the Police, " New
Times. FPh. 7, 1973, p. 34.
43Ibid.
44Dewing, Wounded Knee, p. 93.
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the Custer riot, Wilson requested government protection/ By- 
February 14, there were 70 Federal marshals from a Special 
Operations Group in Pine Ridge with a machine-gun nest atop the 
BIA building.45 In response, those opposing Wilson formed the 
Oglala Civil Rights Organization (OSCRO) and asked AIM to aid 
them in their efforts on Pine Ridge.46 The Civil Rights 
Organization was made up primarily of traditional Oglala Sioux, 
most of whom were women.
In concert with the OSCRO, AIM seized and surrounded the 
small village of Wounded Knee on Feb. 28, 1973. They seized the 
owners of the local trading post and a priest as hostages, but 
vowed they would not hurt them, which they did not. They 
demanded hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
on treaties, a full-scale investigation by the Senate of 
government treatment of Indians, and an inquiry into the Sioux 
reservations in South Dakota. Carter Camp, an AIM leader, 
stated, "We will occupy this town until the Government sees fit 
to deal with the Indian people, particularly the Oglala Sioux 
tribe in South Dakota. We want a true Indian nation, not one 
made up of Bureau of Indian Affairs puppets."47 The stage was
45Rex Weyler, Blood of the Land, (New York; Everest House 
Publishers, 1982), p. 72.
46U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, 
■pupation of Wounded Knee: On Causes and Aftermath of Wounded
Takeover r 93rd Cong., 1st sess ., 1975, p. 142 . (Ref erred to as 
Occupation hearings from hereout.)
rn. 47"Armed Indians Seize Wounded Knee, Hold Hostages, " New York
March 1, 1973, p. 1.
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set for what turned out to be a 71-day ordeal replete with^fa3Lled 
negotiations, broken promises, accusations, anger, and death.
Federal Bureau of Investigations officers joined Federal 
marshals already in Pine Ridge. Together, they formed a cordon 
around Wounded Knee. AIM responded by establishing its own 
barricades. The hostages were allowed to leave, but they chose 
to stay in support of AIM's goals. Along with former hostages*' ̂  
and representatives of various churches, AIM submitted a four- 
point proposal to the government on March 3. It called for 
immediate evacuation of Wounded Knee by the Indians and Federal 
officers, restitution for personal property damage to be paid by 
the Federal government, no mass arrests, and for South Dakota 
clergymen to observe the procedures. The government rejected the 
proposal. The FBI and marshals would not withdraw before all 
Indians had evacuated Wounded Knee and would not guarantee that 
there would be no mass arrests.48
Negotiations continued to falter as media attention grew.
AIM and Wounded Knee received worldwide coverage. Due to a lack 
°f information from the government, the media portrayed AIM's 
side of the conflict most often. At one point, a nationally- 
inducted poll showed that 51% of those polled approved of AIM's 
Seals, and 21% opposed them.49 Bob Burnette, one of the 
°rganizers of the Trail of Broken Treaties, asserted that AIM's 
rnain negotiating point was that the Federal government could ill
48"Indians Offer Accord,” New York Times, March 4, 1973, p. 42.
490ccupation hearings, p. 180.
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afford an Indian massacre in 1973, especially under the watchful 
eye of worldwide press coverage.50 However, that press coverage 
did not deter the almost nightly exchange of gunfire that 
resulted in the deaths of two Indians and the serious wounding of 
an FBI agent.
Finally, both sides reached a settlement on May 5. Three 
days later, the FBI and Marshals pulled back their forces and all 
Indians left Wounded Knee. AIM gained a subcommittee hearing on 
the causes of the takeover, but most participants were charged 
with a variety of crimes ranging from disturbing the peace to 
conspiracy. However, the hearings came before the trials and 
answered many of the questions concerning AIM's involvement.
Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota conducted the 
hearings on June 16 and 17 on the Pine Ridge Reservation. AIM 
leaders, government officials, and the Indians of Pine Ridge 
Presented testimony concerning the causes of the takeover and 
Possible changes in policy. The most important testimony 
concerning AIM came from Russell Means and several Sioux women. 
The women claimed responsibility for bringing AIM to the 
reservation and helping to organize the takeover. Means 
supported those assertions by saying he had seen a list of 
600 names represented by OSCRO. Also, he claimed that AIM went 
ho Wounded Knee only after consulting with traditional Oglala 
chiefs and medicine men. Those meetings were open to anyone 
interested and took place on February 26 and 27. Thus, AIM
50Burnette and Koster, The Road to Wounded Knee, p. 156.
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neither instigated or initiated the activities at Wounded Knee on 
its own nor without consent from a large number of Indians on the 
reservation.51
Means discussed AIM's goals and future relationship with 
whites, Indians, and the Federal government. He described AIM's 
goals as sovereignty and self-determination for all tribes. AIM 
wanted reservations to be established as separate states under 
protectorate status with an end to wardship status.52 
Means believed that those objectives represented the views 
of traditional, full-blood Indians. However, he did note that 
"as a member of the American Indian Movement and as a leader 
of that movement we have never claimed, nor will we ever claim, 
that we represent all Indian people, we just represent a fact of 
Indian life." He added, "if not, I will be proven wrong."53
In talking about demands for the return of the Black Hills, 
Means suggested reparations and/or lease payments to be worked 
out by Federal and state governments and the government of the 
Teton Sioux. It was for the elders and holy men to decide the 
course of action, though, not AIM.54 Means also said, "In no 
w*y do we want to ostracize the present non-Indian owners of land 
that actually bought from the tribe, from the Government." The 
government, he continued, had to find a way to reconcile the





claims justly.. According to Means,. AIM did not want others 
treated as Indians had been in respect to land seizures.55
It is clear that Means understood the delicacy, if not the 
patience, required to achieve AIM's goals. He recognized that 
AIM had little control over decisions of the tribe or Federal 
government. AIM's leadership, including Means, favored a new 
tribal government with the elders and traditional chiefs in 
control. A letter delivered from Marvin Franklin, Assistant to 
the Secretary of the Interior, to the hearings recognized 
petitions signed by 1445 tribal members that called for a similar 
change in their form of government.56 Attached resolutions from 
traditional Oglala leaders supported AIM and its objectives.57 
In addition to the above, further statements by tribal members 
showed that AIM did not act alone or without the consent of many 
groups on the reservation in seizing Wounded Knee. AIM, as 
represented by Means at the hearing, realized that greater 
cooperation and communication was needed between AIM and Indians, 
government, and whites. That realization heralded a change in 
AIM's tacti cs as the Wounded Knee trials approached.
There were two Wounded Knee trials. The first trial, known 
*s the leadership trial, involved only Dennis Banks and Russell 
Means. They were charged with conspiracy, larceny, and assault, 





In arranging separate trials, the Justice Department made a 
distinction as to whom the government thought should bear the 
brunt of responsibility for the takeover and the problems it 
caused. The government singled out Banks and Means as the 
leaders of the siege and implied that, in general, AIM held 
ultimate responsibility.
The leadership trial opened on February 12, 1974 in St.
Paul, Minnesota. Judge Fred Nichol moved the trial from Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota because he did not believe Banks and Means 
could get a fair trial there.58 The trial lasted seven months 
and attracted tremendous attention. Finally, on September 16, 
Nichol dismissed all charges. Nichols decried the FBI's tactics 
in trying to gain a conviction and criticized the buying of 
witnesses and perjured testimony by FBI agents during the 
trial.59
The second trial began in late 1974 in Omaha. The Justice 
Department charged defendants with many of the same offenses 
attributed to Banks and Means in the first trial. The Indians in 
the second trial, though, tried a new defense. They contended 
that the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 prevented the Federal 
government from involving itself in reservation matters and,
58Martin Waldron, "Wounded Knee Trial Opens With Revolt 
Wa^ning, " New York Times, Feb. 13, 1974, p. 1.
59Martin Waldron, ”2 Freed as Judge Scores U.S.-Wounded Knee 
Lase," New York Times, Sept. 17, 1974, p. 1.
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therefore, their arrests had been made illegally.60 However, 
District Court Judge Warren Urbom ruled that laws since 1868 
superseded the treaty and, therefore, the Sioux had no 
sovereignty to support their defense.61 However, courts later 
dismissed many of the cases and counts. In addition, eleven 
indictments were dismissed against AIM leaders Carter Camp, Stan 
Holder, and Leonard Crow Dog.62 The Federal government could 
not successfully prosecute AIM on charges stemming from Wounded 
Knee. In fact, none of AIM's national leadership was ever 
convicted for any charges arising from Wounded Knee.
During the many legal battles between 197 3 and 1975, AIM 
moved ahead. In November 1973, AIM's leaders met with the 
National Tribal Chairman's Association and the National Congress 
of American Indians in the hopes of forming a coalition to press 
for Indian rights.63 Though ultimately unsuccessful, it 
forecast the new direction in AIM's activities. Dennis Banks 
mediated a peaceful resolution to a developing crisis in Ontario, 
Canada in August 1974. He negotiated a settlement between 
Indians protesting development at Kenora Park and the Canadian
60Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, ed., The Great Sioux Nation: Sitting
in Judgement on America. (Berkeley, CA: Moon Books, 1977), p. 16.
61Martin Waldron,"Sioux Claim of Sovereignty Rejected; Judge
Says Laws Supersede Treaties,” New York Times. Jan. 18, 1975, p. 24 .
“ "Indictments Dismissed, " New York Times, February 6, 1975,
P- 35.
63James Sterba, "Indian Militants Appeal For Unity," New York 
Jiffies, Nov. 1, 1973, p. 12.
government.64
Two other incidents indicated AIM's move towards less - 
confrontational tactics by its leadership. First, from June 8- 
16, 1974 on the Standing Rock. Sioux Reservation in South Dakota, 
AIM organized the First International Treaty Council. 
Representatives of 97 tribes from across North and South America 
formulated, issued, and signed a Declaration of Continuing 
Independence. The Declaration recognized all lands belonging to 
"Native Nations" as clearly defined by past treaties. The 
Council was formed to implement the declarations, establish 
offices in Washington, D.C. and New York City to approach 
"international forces" necessary to obtain treaty recognition, 
apply to the United Nations for recognition and membership, and 
open negotiations with the U.S. Department of State.65 AIM 
directed its energies towards a resolution of treaty questions 
through international diplomatic channels. Though somewhat 
misguided and confused on the nature of treaty relations, the 
Council, as supported and advanced by AIM, signalled a turn in 
AIM's direction and a realization of the dangers of 
confrontation.
Second, Russell Means ran for tribal council president on 
pine Ridge in 1974. Realizing that valid change and acceptance 
must come from legitimacy granted by the people, Means ran
,64Robert Trumbull, "Indian Standoff in Ontario Ends," New York
times, Aug. 20, 1974, p. 13.
65Dunbar-Ortiz, The Great Sioux Nation, p. 200-202.
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against Dick: Wilson - the man AIM tried to depose during its 
seizure of Wounded Knee. Means and Wilson were the top'vote- 
getters in the run-off election and moved on to face each other 
in the general election. Officially Wilson won, 1,714-1,514; but 
Means called for a government investigation and recount. The 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found a "pattern of widespread 
abuses and irregularities in the conduct of the election."66 
Almost one-third of all who voted did so improperly or illegally. 
The report chastised the BIA for not investigating sooner as the 
Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Committee had requested. 
Finally, the report recommended that a new election be held with 
greater security, safeguards, and accuracy.67 However, a new 
election was never held, and Dick Wilson remained tribal council 
president.
Though successes were few, AIM's leadership continued its 
new course. The politics of confrontation had cost them much in 
terms of money, legal battles, leadership, support, and respect. 
AIM's growing realization that mediation and negotiation were 
better accomplished through the system pushed them to more 
Moderate and conventional political tactics. They amassed 
support from people and groups around the world who opposed the 
continued oppression of American Indians. By the time of the 
Eastland hearings in 1976, AIM had long since moved from its more
66U.S., Congress, Commission on Civil Rights, Report of
Investigation:____ Qglala Sioux Tribe, General Election. 1974,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 2-3.
67Report of Investigation, p. 3-28.
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militant and volatile past. In fact, AIM's national leadership 
moved away from the reservations in order to solicit 
international support and assistance to put pressure on the U.S. 
government to hear AIM's claims of treaty violations. Worn out 
from constant government harassment, numerous legal battles, an 
increasingly unsympathetic media, and faltering public support by 
1976, AIM's leadership concentrated on international solutions, 
rather than local uprisings. Despite AIM's changes in policy, 
though, the Eastland hearing judged AIM to be revolutionary. To 
understand why, one must know something of the Eastland 
committee, its perceptions of AIM, and where it gained those 
perceptions.
CHAPTER THREE
AIM's activities often drew attention. Despite many 
victories in court (Out of 542 charges brought against AIM 
members during the early and mid-1970's, only 15 resulted in 
convictions by jury.), many Indians as well as elements in the 
Federal government continued to regard AIM as dangerous.1 At 
least in part for that reason, AIM could not achieve greater 
support on the reservations or prompt the government to make 
changes in Federal Indian policy. AIM's failures in those areas 
stemmed from persistent fears of AIM by reservation Indians,
AIM's misunderstanding of Federal Indian law, and government 
Perceptions of AIM.
AIM's membership, particularly its leadership, drew largely 
from urban areas or areas where tribal traditions and identity
*Ward Churchill, "Goons, G-Men, and AIM," The Progressive, 
April 1990, p. 28.
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systems were weak. Its ideology attracted persons' without a 
strong sense of tribal identity or culture. AIM placed emphasis 
upon spirituality, Indianness, pride in being Indian, and Indian 
unity.2 AIM's approach submerged tribal identities in favor of 
a generalized "Indianness."3 Members came to regard themselves 
as Indians and AIM members first and members of individual tribes 
second.4 Many reservation Indians neither accepted nor 
appreciated such a view. One noted Indian author, Vine Deloria, 
suggested that most Indians did not want unity and that efforts 
to achieve unity were, therefore, fruitless. Individual tribes 
wanted to retain the individuality and uniqueness of their own 
culture.5 AIM never grasped that principle.
A prime example of AIM's failure to understand tribalism 
occurred during the occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973. Those 
inside Wounded Knee named Dennis Banks, a Chippewa Indian from 
Minnesota, head of the Oglala Independent Nation.6 To native 
Oglala Sioux on the reservation, Banks' appointment affronted 
their unique tribal identity. Only an Oglala could serve as the 
head of an Oglala nation. As AIM intensified its efforts on
2Rachel A. Bonney, "The Role of AIM Leaders in Indian Nationalism," American Indian Quarterly, Fall 1977, p. 218-219.
3Ibid., p. 211.
4Ibid., p. 222.
5Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died For Your Sins, (New York: 
Avon Books, 1969), p. 220-221.
6Bill Kovack, "F.B.I. Agent Shot as Indians Warn U.S.," New 
Xprk Times, March 12, 1973, p. 28.
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reservations, many Indians sided wittT'their tribes against AIM. 
Without a tribal tradition behind them, AIM's leaders failed to 
grasp the depth and strength of tribal bonds.
AIM's stress upon unity and universal goals for all Indians 
caused other problems. Without an understanding of tribal 
identity or tribalism, AIM failed to comprehend the relationship 
between individual tribes and the Federal government. AIM saw 
only the outward appearance of reservation life - poverty, 
illiteracy, sickness. They did not realize how tribal government 
worked, the extent of Federal control, or the process by which 
change might occur.
By the 1970's, the Federal government no longer treated or 
referred to Indians as wards. The government had become a 
trustee to individual Indians. Congress provided funds and 
assistance to tribes, but the BIA no longer participated in the 
daily workings of tribal government.7 Tribes had exclusive 
control over matters of internal self-government, unless 
otherwise limited by Federal treaties, agreements, or statutes. 
One such limitation was Federal jurisdiction over major crimes 
such as murder and conspiracy.8 The Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968 affirmed tribal sovereignty and supremacy on the 
reservation, while protecting civil rights for all Indians.
7Michael Smith, "The Constitutional Status Of American 
Indians," Civil Rights Digest, Fall 1973, p. 15.
8Rennard Strickland, ed. Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law. (Charlottesville, VA: Michie, Bobbs-Merrill, 1982), p.663 .
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Hqweyer, the Act did not include several limitations placed on 
Federal and state governments by the U.S. Constitution (Tribes 
are governed by treaties and Congressional Acts, not by the 
Constitution. Tribal members are governed by-the Constitution 
and tribal laws.). Among the limitations omitted were guarantee 
of a republican form of government, prohibition of an established 
religion, requirement of free counsel for an indigent accused, 
right to a jury trial in civil cases, provisions broadening the 
right to vote, and prohibition against denial of the privileges 
and immunities of citizens.9 Congress omitted those limitations 
because it wished to limit its intrusion into traditional tribal 
independence and to insure the sovereignty of the tribes.10
AIM challenged tribal government in form and substance 
without realizing the extent of tribal autonomy. AIM attacked 
tribal government, in general, as corrupt and inefficient. It may 
have been. However, AIM failed to comprehend that tribal 
governments could be. changed and adapted to fit the wishes of the 
tribe. Reservation Indians perceived AIM's attacks upon tribal 
government as an attack on its form, upon those who had chosen 
its form and leaders, and, thus, an attack upon the Indians, 
themselves. In failing to realize the extent of a tribe's 
control over its form of government, AIM failed to comprehend the 
implications of that self-governance.




forms and authority created additional problems. The Indian 
Reorganization ACT (IRA) of 1934 allowed Indians to choose how 
they wished to govern internal tribal affairs. Additionally, 
tribes that had rejected governance under the guidelines of the 
IRA could choose whatever governmental form they desired.11 
However, most tribes patterned their governments along the 
republican forms of white society. One Indian, Joseph Muskrat,, a 
regional director for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 
suggested Indians had little choice in the matter. Muskrat 
asserted that constant defeats and subjugation cost Indians the 
ability to govern themselves; they could no longer protect their 
land, property, families, or culture. Indians had no other 
examples from which to draw ideas on self-governance. Other 
possibilities had been erased by time. Thus, many tribes simply 
copied the government of their conquerors.12
Thus, AIM's attacks on tribal government and calls for a 
return to tribal rule by traditional chiefs and medicine-men 
carried the implication that mistakes had been made. Indians did 
not take kindly to the idea that they and their ancestors had 
made bad choices. AIM failed to recognize, again, how Indians 
Perceived such attacks.
AIM's failure to comprehend the development and extent of
“ Indian Reorganization Act (1934), U.S. Statutes at Large, 
vol. 48, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), p.
984.
12Joseph Muskrat, "Thoughts on the Indian Dilemma, " Civil 
Rights Digest, Fall 1973, p. 49-50.
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tribal government or the strength of tribalism, combined with 
AIM's self-righteousness, drastically curbed the organization's 
effectiveness on reservations. Reservation Indians resented 
having their faults and mistakes pointed out by a group of 
outsiders. They did not appreciate being told how to run their 
reservations. Finally, they reacted unfavorably to a group that 
failed to recognize the uniqueness of each tribe's culture. As a 
result, AIM alienated itself from the people it wanted to help.
AIM's militant stance created further negative impressions 
on reservations. AIM leaders initially adopted the position that 
only confrontation could accomplish its goals, but later toned 
down their methods.13 In the course of confrontation, AIM 
members were willing to die for their cause and expected other 
Indians to feel the same way.14 In their minds, dying would 
make them martyrs and, thus, focus more attention on their goals. 
Such an attitude received a negative reaction from tribal leaders 
worried about takeovers on their reservations similar to the one 
at Wounded Knee.15 Moreover, they feared government reprisals 
against their reservations for such confrontations. Once again, 
AIM posed a threat to tribes from the outside.
The American public, including Indians and the Federal 
government, obtained much of their information on AIM from the




media. In the early 1970's, the media actively courted AIM and 
portrayed them as yet another deprived minority attempting to 
throw off the yoke of oppression and racism. AIM reciprocated by 
giving the media what it wanted. AIM first learned to export its 
message through the media during the occupation of the BIA 
Building in 1972. According to one member, AIM learned that when 
Indians are nice and quiet, no one listened, However, when they 
made noise and acted out their frustrations, they received plenty 
of public .support and media coverage.16 Todd Gitlin's 
examination of the New Left's relationship with the media 
revealed similar patterns. Gitlin stated that "the media were 
giving lurid prominence to the wildest and most cacophonous 
rhetoric, and broadcasting the most militant, violent, bizarre, 
and discordant actions, and within the boundaries of any action, 
the most violent segments."17 Many times it became difficult to 
judge who used whom in this scenario. Nonetheless, the media 
swarmed to cover the oppression of yet another minority group, 
especially one as proud and noble as the American Indian.
Many government officials correctly believed that AIM 
manipulated the press. At Wounded Knee, the government and some 
reporters thought that AIM used the media to draw out the 
conflict and gain wider sympathy.18 In the Chicago Sun-Times.
16Crow Dog, Lakota Woman, p. 88.
17Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching. (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1980), p. 182.
18Victor Gold, "Of Fallen Trees and Wounded Knees, " National 
Review. April 27, 1973, p. 464.
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Tom Fitzpatrick described the "arrest' of four ranchers at 
Wounded Knee. After ..their arrest, AIM members marched the, 
ranchers before TV cameras and then released them.19 Robert 
Enstad of the Chicago Tribune reported a similar incident at 
Wounded Knee on March 25, 1973. He said, "On one occasion, a 
young man guarding an Indian roadblock had to be reminded that he 
didn't look very mean or warlike with an expensive camera 
dangling next to his rifle. So he put the camera aside as he 
posed as a warrior for a photograph."20 Talking about AIM's use 
of the press, Terri Schultz of Harpers said, "We wrote good 
cowboy-and- Indian stories because we thought it was what the 
public wanted, and they were harmless, even if they were not all 
true."21 The government did not regard the stories as harmless.
Charles Ablard, assistant Deputy Attorney General, claimed, 
"The press has created a climate of undue sympathy for AIM."22 
Charles Soller, an aide in the Department of the Interior, 
further claimed, "It could have been settled in a week if it 
weren't for this horde (reporters) .1,23
19Desmond Smith, "Wounded Knee: The Media Coup d'etat,"
Nation, June 25, 1973, p. 808.
20Victor Gold, 'Of Fallen Trees and Wounded knees," National 
Review. April 27, 1973, p. 465.
21Terri Schultz, "Bamboozle Me Not at Wounded Knee," Harpers, 
June 1973, p. 56.
22"Trap at Wounded Knee," Time, March 26, 1973, p. 67.
23Ibid., p. 67.
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AIM's perceived manipulation of the press offended two 
groups: the Federal government and reservation Indians. AIM's
favorable press coverage and the media's presentation of the 
government as an overbearing, uncaring, cheating step-father to 
Indians angered the government bureaucracy. Indians opposed the 
intrusion upon their lives by the press. They regarded this as 
another example of outsiders pointing out the flaws and 
shortcomings of reservation life and government. Indians knew 
their system was not perfect, but it was their system. While the 
press depicted AIM in a favorable light, the media portrayed 
reservation Indians as direction-less and in need of AIM's 
assistance. Reservation Indians resented that portrayal.
Finally, disregard for public and private property caused 
further resentment of AIM by Indians and the government. The 
destruction of property and theft of documents during the BIA 
occupation as well as the destruction of private property at 
Wounded Knee disturbed the government. In the latter case, the 
government used Federal agents to prevent further damage. In 
both cases, Indians feared personal recriminations for AIM's 
actions. However, none were forthcoming. In fact, Congress 
established the American Indian Policy Review Commission on 
January 2, 1975 , in the wake of Wounded Knee, to investigate 
Federal Indian policy and make recommendations.24 In addition, 
Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act 
in 1975 to support greater goals of education to provide
24Dewing, Wounded Knee, p.
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effective future leaders to advance tribal self-determination.
The Act provided, additional funding for education and gave 
Indians greater control and autonomy over educational and 
political institutions previously administered by the BIA.25 
The new freedoms would, thus, open the door for new ideas and 
leadership.
However, despite legislation that reinforced AIM's goals, 
AIM's favorable portrayal in the media, the government's 
inability to convict AIM's leaders of wrongdoing, and a change in 
tactics by AIM's leadership, many Indians and elements in the 
Federal government still perceived AIM as dangerous. The murder 
of two FBI agents, Jack Coler and Ronald Williams, on the Pine 
Ridge (S.D.) Reservation on June 26, 1975 confirmed those 
fears.26 Two years later, a Federal District Court jury found 
AIM member Leonard Peltier guilty of the murders. The court 
sentenced Peltier to two consecutive life sentences in prison.27 
Despite Peltier's conviction, some doubt remained as to what 
really happened that day. However, most people, including 
Indians and those in the Federal government, discerned the causes 
and consequences of the murders.
For many, the occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973 produced
25Strickland, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, p. 662.
26John Crewsdon, ”2 F.B.I. Men Die, Indian Reported Slain in 
Sioux Village Near Wounded Knee," New York Times. June 27, 1975, 
P. 1.
27"Indian Gets Life Sentences In Killing of F.B.I. Agents, New 
Xork Times. June 3, 1977, p. 10.
the murders. At Wounded Knee, AIM exposed and highlighted the 
concerns that divided Indians on Pine Ridge. Those divisions, 
then revolved around two divergent positions - those who 
supported AIM and those who did not. The division .became more 
pronounced as tensions remained high after the occupation ended. 
With the barricades for both sides down, the tension exploded 
into over two years of violence and lawlessness on the 
reservation. Between March 1, 1973 and March 1, 1976, the FBI 
documented 61 violent deaths on Pine Ridge. Those numbers 
equated to a yearly muder rate of 170 per 100,000 (Detroit, the 
city with the highest murder rate for the same period, had a rate 
of 20.2 per 100 , 0 0 0 .).28 For many, especially Indians on Pine 
Ridge, AIM's presence on Pine Ridge caused the violence and, 
eventually, the deaths of the two Federal agents.
Many blamed AIM for the climate of fear and violence on Pine 
Ridge. The media presented images of chaos, confusion, and 
lawlessness. Indians, elsewhere, feared similar situations on 
their reservations. Whites feared violence would move outward 
from the reservations. The Federal government saw the violence 
on Pine Ridge, and particularly the murders of Coler and 
Williams, as a symptom of AIM's inherently dangerous tactics.
The continued opposition to AIM from many sources led, 
eventually, to the Eastland Committee's hearing on AIM in 1976.
28Bruce Johansen and Roberto Maestas, Wasi'chu: The Continuing
Indian Wars, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 83.
CHAPTER FOUR
James O. Eastland used his committee chairmanship of the 
Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
to attack communism.1 Throughout his 36 years in the Senate, 
Eastland had been a stern foe of both communism and liberalism.
He opposed desegregation and occasionally referred to blacks as 
"inferior."2 He accused liberals of attempting to undermine the
Revolutionary Activities hearing, p. II. Members of the 
Subcommittee included Birch Bayh of Indiana, John McClellan of 
Arkansas, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, and William L. Scott of 
Virginia. However, only Eastland and the Subcommittee's chief 
counsel Richard L. Schultz were in attendance at the hearing on 
AIM. In fact, Bayh refused to participate in the hearing and later 
condemned the Subcommittee for issuing a report "on the basis of 
the unchallenged testimony of one solitary witness." He added that 
the report "seem to have no other purpose than to discredit a 
number of individuals, including . . . the American Indian
Movement." Johanna Brand, The Life and Death of Anna Mae Aguash, 
(Toronto; James Lorimer and Co., 1978), p. 108-9.
2Marjorie Hunter, "James O. Eastland Is Dead at 81; Leading 
Senate Foe of Integration," New York Times, Feb. 20, 1986, Section
60Constitution so they could bring socialism to America. He 
charged that many Supreme Court decisions made during Chief 
Justice Earl Warren's tenure favored the Communist Party. During 
an investigation of major newspapers, Eastland accused the New 
York Times of communist sympathies.3
In general, Eastland saw communism everywhere and, through 
the Internal Security Subcommittee, sought to eradicate it.
Under Eastland's direction, the Subcommittee's hearings resembled 
an inquisition more than an investigation. The Subcommittee 
heard only testimony that reinforced Eastland's allegations of 
communist ties and/or revolutionary behavior. Eastland's 
emphasis was quite similar to the McCarthy hearings of the 
1950's, but Eastland's Committee had far less impact. In AIM's 
case, Eastland seemed to have concocted a formula of violence 
plus communism equalled advocacy of revolution.4 Thus, he 
attempted to connect AIM's sometimes hostile confrontations to a 
larger communist threat. In reality, no connection existed.
That, however, did not deter Eastland.
The testimony of Douglas Durham provided the sole basis for 
Eastland's assertions. Durham had infiltrated AIM as a paid 
informant for the FBI. He joined AIM in March 1973 and remained 
a member for approximately 2 years. During that time, he served 
as public relations director and, later, assistant director of 
the Des Moines, Iowa chapter. He also held several positions
3Ibid.
R̂evolutionary Activities, p .1.
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with the national organization: national AIM pilot, national
security director, director of national offices of AIM, and 
bodyguard to Dennis Banks. During his 2-year tenure, Durham 
became familiar with AIM's leadership and goals.5 Durham's 
observations and the documents he produced constituted the 
entirety of the hearing.
Eastland accepted Durham's testimony and accusations without 
question. For our purposes, though, Durham's reliability must be 
explored before accepting the validity of his accusations. On 
March 7, 1975 AIM leaders exposed Durham as an informant and 
asked him to leave the organization. At a press conference a few 
days later, Durham said he was "relieved" to have been found out 
because he respected Banks and believed AIM to be a "legal, 
social organization that wasn't doing anything wrong."6 A year 
and a half later at the Eastland hearing, Durham claimed, in 
reference to AIM, "They are in fact a violent group that have 
stated they are non-violent. They are dedicated to the overthrow 
of our Government, and they have trampled the civil rights of 
Indian, as well as non-Indian, citizens in the country."7
Durham gave no reason for this change in attitude. In fact, 
despite his belief that AIM might terminate suspected informants,
5Ibid., p. 4.
6John Kifner, "Security Chief for Militant Indian Group Says 
Ne Was a Paid Informer for F.B.I.," New York Times, March 13, 1975, 
P. 31.
Revolutionary Activities, p . 4.
he admitted that he had never been threatened.8 Banks and 
Vernon Bellecourt discussed with James Thomas, a United Methodist 
Bishop, and John Adams, a columnist for Christian Century, how to 
handle Durham's expulsion. Once confronted, Durham confessed and 
offered to expose further FBI infiltration of AIM.9 If AIM's 
leaders planned to eliminate Durham, it is doubtful they would 
have discussed his situation with anyone outside of AIM. In 
addition, AIM had nothing to gain by silencing Durham or any 
other informants. Such a move would only have created more 
problems for AIM. Therefore, Durham's reversal in attitude 
towards AIM defied explanation. His reliability must, therefore, 
be questioned.
Durham's presence as sole witness presented another 
interesting question: Why were not FBI files used to implicate
AIM in revolutionary activities? Although Durham worked for the 
FBI, they provided no documents or information to support his 
testimony. The FBI had amassed 316,000 file classifications on 
Ai m .10 Yet, the Eastland committee saw none of that mass of 
information. In fact, Clarence Kelley, Director of the FBI, at a 
trial of AIM members in 1976 stated, "It is my very definite 
knowledge that the American Indian Movement is a movement which
8Ibid., p. 8-9.
9John H. Adams, "AIM and the FBI," Christian Century, April 2, 
1975, p. 325-6.
10Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, Agents of Repression: 
She FBI's Secret War Against the Black Panther Party and the 
American Indian Movement. (Boston: South End Press, 1988), p. 177.
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has fine goals, has. many fine people, and has as its general 
consideration of what needs to be done, something that is 
worthwhile; and it is not tabbed by us as an un-American, 
subversive, or otherwise objectionable organization.”11 Kelley 
admitted further that an FBI memo - released to. .the press-stating 
that AIM members had M-16. machine-guns and planned to blowup 
buildings, shoot tourists and policemen, take action against M t . 
Rushmore, and assassinate South Dakota's -Governor, Richard Kneip 
was totally false.12 Considering this, it is no wonder Eastland 
chose not to use FBI sources of information except for Durham.
Durham and Eastland made many assertions concerning AIM's 
revolutionary nature. They sought to prove that AIM was a 
violent, communist-oriented organization that had little support 
from Indians. On the last point, Eastland claimed "the record is 
clear that the elected tribal councils look upon the American 
Indian Movement as a radical and subversive organization."13 A 
letter from the National Tribal Chairman's Association (NTCA) to 
the then-Secretary of the Interior, Roger Morton, provided the 
basis for Eastland's assertion. The NTCA accused some members of 
the Department of the Interior of conspiring to help AIM by 
giving heed to their ideas and providing travel money to some AIM
nMatthiesen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, p, 312.
12Paul Delaney, "F.B.I. Chief Admits Alert on Indians Lacked 
Proof," New York Times, July 8, 1976, p. 16.
^Revolutionary Activities, p. 2.
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members.14 Durham added, "In this letter they have stated their 
disdain for the people who they say are operating adversely to 
the interest of reservation Indians . . .1,15 While it is true
the NTCA opposed AIM, the NTCA, in this letter, seemed more 
concerned with the "open complicity" between undesirable elements 
•in AIM and the BIA. The NTCA worried that its influence with the 
BIA might wane. Two more factors must also be considered in 
assessing the usefulness of the letter to verify AIM's lack of 
acceptance among tribal leaders. First, the letter was written 
three years before the hearing in the wake of Wounded Knee. 
Eastland did not bother to check on the NTCA's current attitude 
towards AIM. Second, Eastland and Durham implied that AIM's 
leadership sought to speak for all Indians. AIM attempted to 
speak for tribal issues, but AIM leader Russell Means simply 
considered AIM to be a "fact of Indian life."16
Eastland believed that AIM's lack of support from the Indian 
community stemmed from AIM's revolutionary nature. For Eastland, 
AIM's revolutionary character stemmed from its violent nature and 
communist affiliations. In order to support those assertions, 
Eastland attempted to prove that the national organ of AIM had 
ties to many communist or leftist organizations that advocated 
violence as a viable means for achieving their goals.
Early in the hearing, Eastland produced a staff report
14Ibid., p. 79-81.
15Ibid., p. 7.
16Occupation hearings, p. 171.
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allegedly tying AIM to the Communist Party., The report claimed 
AIM had once called itself the American Indian Liberation 
Movement.17 AIM never used that name. The report further 
stated that the Communist Party wished "to win the widest mass 
support for the current and developing struggles for Indian 
liberation; to give special attention to winning the working 
class."18 Communists have often decried the American 
government's and people's treatment of Indians as yet another 
example of American racism and weakness. The Party's devotion to 
Indian liberation made no direct reference to AIM or to violence. 
However, Eastland asserted that the connection had been made.19
In his testimony, Durham claimed that the national AIM 
received direct financial support from the Communist Party during 
the standoff in Kenora Park, Ontario in 19 7 4 . 20 Dennis Banks 
negotiated the peace resolution, but the incident involved no 
national leaders; it had been a local movement.21 Moreover,
Durham did not say what happened to the money or how it was used. 
He also claimed that the Communist Party of the U.S.A. (CPUSA) 
played a role in operating the Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense




21Robert Trumbull, "Indian Standoff In Ontario Ends," New York 
Times, Aug. 20, 1974, p. 13.
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Committee office..22 The Committee provided legal support for . 
defendants in cases arising from, the occupation of Wounded Kneei 
Again, Durham did not describe CPUSA's role or provide evidence 
to support his accusation. Despite a lack of evidence, Eastland 
readily accepted the accusations as true.
Durham continued to draw connections between AIM and 
communist or leftist organizations. He listed organizations that 
expressed support for AIM or had direct contact with AIM. Durham 
claimed that Dennis Banks met with officials of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization while at a meeting sponsored by the World 
Council of Churches in 1974 .23 In the course of that meeting, 
according to Durham, the PLO offered support to Banks. Durham 
did not provide information on whether support extended from 
Banks to AIM, if Banks accepted, or if the PLO and AIM ever had 
any other dealings. Durham also claimed that AIM members met 
with members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1974 during 
the Wounded Knee trials of Banks and Means. Durham claimed that, 
later, Sean O'Connaith, an IRA leader, invited AIM members to 
Ireland for a meeting (Durham admitted, though, that AIM did not 
attend.).24 Despite his claims, Durham again provided no 
evidence besides his testimony and gave no indication that AIM 
leaders had accepted anything other than vocal support.
Durham then listed numerous organizations which voiced




support or demonstrated in support of AIM. According to Durham, 
AIM did not solicit support or acknowledge it. All of the groups 
simply voiced support for AIM and its goals.25 In addition to 
the groups mentioned by Durham, many church groups, government 
employees, and Amnesty International gave vocal support of AIM in 
its struggle against racism, poverty, and government 
oppression.26
Durham weakened his own arguments on several points. First, 
he failed to provide substantial proof or documentation for his 
accusations. Second, he provided no evidence that AIM's 
leadership ever solicited, accepted, or acknowledged the support 
it received. Third, Durham believed the United Farm Workers and 
the National Organization of Women were communist or extremely 
leftist organizations. He also claimed that the raised, clenched 
fist was a symbol of communism.27 It may have been, but in 
1960's America it also symbolized the "power" movements of that 
generation. His mislabelling, lumping of several fairly
25Ibid. , p. 73, 77, 90, 180.
Here is a listing of groups named by Durham: Organization of
Arab Students, Iranian Students' Association, American Servicemen's 
Union, Black Panther Party, New York Consulate of the Republic of 
New Africa, Carlos Feliciano Defense Committee, American Committee 
on Africa, Youth Against War and Fascism, National Alliance Against 
Racist and Political Oppression, Lincoln De-Tox Program, New York 
American Indian Movement, Indo-China Solidarity Committee, 
Prisoners' Solidarity Committee, Middle Eastern research and 
Information Project, International Committee to Free South 
Vietnamese Political Prisoners from Detention, Torture and Death, 
Weather Underground, Revolutionary Student Brigade, Puerto Rican 
Solidarity Committee, and the Symbionese Liberation Army.
26Johansen and Maestas, Wasi'chu, p. 113.
27Ibid., p. 74-75 .
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mainstream organizations as communist, and misleading and, 
somewhat, erroneous designation of symbols and rhetoric muddled 
Durham's accusations in confusion. They presented a picture of a 
man who did not understand communism, but felt qualified to 
identify it and to accuse groups of being communist. Finally, 
Durham admitted that Banks wanted an assessment of values and 
goals for the groups offering AIM support.28 Banks wanted AIM 
to associate only with those groups most useful in achieving the 
goals of the national organization. AIM's focused goals took 
precedence over the goals of a greater revolutionary cause. 
However, Durham and Eastland lumped AIM together with all 
suspected revolutionary organizations.
Along with a communist threat, Eastland considered all 
"revolutionary" groups violent. Therefore, to fulfill Eastland's 
requirements of a revolutionary threat, AIM's violent nature had 
to be proven. Towards that end, Durham listed violent situations 
and confrontations. He mentioned Wounded Knee, the riot at 
Custer, the BIA offices occupation, Kenora, Ontario, an alleged 
plot to kidnap the governor of Iowa, and AIM's plan for the - 
Bicentennial .29
There is no doubt that violence erupted at many of AIM's 
protests and confrontations, however, Durham had not wholly 
supported his accusations that AIM was inherently violent or 




injuries for which AIM must share responsibility because of its 
leadership role during the occupation. Violence was a 
consequence of the tense posturing presented by both sides there. 
AIM could ill afford to have its tenuous public image tarnished 
by becoming overtly or expressedly violent, though. The riot at 
Custer and the destruction caused at the BIA offices had been 
spontaneous with anger, frustration, and violence directed at 
property, not people. And, at the BIA offices, AIM had not acted 
alone; many non-AIM Indians also took part. In addition, AIM 
leaders attempted to diffuse both situations before they erupted. 
Threats of violence were not carried out at Kenora, and AIM 
leaders were not involved. AIM did not kidnap the governor of 
Iowa, Robert Ray. In fact, AIM had positive dealings with Ray on 
two occasions. On August 23, 1973 AIM members occupied the 
Grimes State Office Building in Des Moines under the leadership 
of Douglas Durham. After presenting their demands to Ray, AIM 
members voluntarily gave themselves up for arrest.30 On the 
second occasion, in the fall of 1976, Dennis Banks requested and 
received a meeting with Ray to discuss the problems of Indians in 
Iowa.31 As for AIM's plans for the Bicentennial, nothing 
happened. In this case, AIM's words spoke louder than their 
actions.
When violence did occur, it was not under the direction or 




actions made by individual members., Though AIM's leadership 
condoned violence as a consequence of action, usually, they did 
not coordinate, supervise, or actively participate in violent 
behavior. Durham provided no hard evidence for his accusations, 
but Eastland accepted them nonetheless. The fact that AIM 
members, and more important AIM's leaders, were rarely convicted 
of wrongdoing also damaged Durham's assertions. Granted, AIM 
members had committed indictable offenses, but the inability of 
the courts to prove AIM's leadership liable or responsible did 
not help Durham. At Kenora, the Grimes Building, and the BIA 
occupation, AIM members suffered no fines or imprisonment.
State, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies rarely let 
dangerous revolutionaries off the hook. Durham admitted 
throughout his testimony, though, that that had been the case.
In addition, Durham undermined his own testimony by admitting 
that the protests and demonstrations in which he had participated 
had been peaceful.32 Granted, Durham did not want to engage in 
illegal acts, but how could he make claims of AIM's revolutionary 
character if he never participated or witnessed such behavior?
Durham also accused AIM of stockpiling arms. AIM did gather 
and maintain arms for future use and members were not adverse to 
using arms if a hostile or violent situation arose. However, 
Durham charged that AIM members stole from armories in the 
Pacific Northwest and bought 15 semi-automatic rifles of 
Czechoslovakian make. However, he provided no dates for the
32Ibid., p. 26.
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robberies, knew of no plans concerning the robberies, and made no 
connection between AIM's leadership and the weapons.
Furthermore, none of the weapons Durham claimed to have been 
stolen or bought turned up in AIM hands.33 Once again, the 
Subcommittee had only Durham's word to support his accusations.
A press release furnished the most damaging evidence of 
AIM's violent nature. Durham submitted an article from the Des 
Moines Tribune of August 28, 1973 in which Ron Petite, AIM's 
Midwest National Field Director, called on Indians to bear 
firearms "at all times to protect ourselves and family."34 
Petite claimed to have Banks' authorization for the statement.35 
The announcement resulted from the confusion that followed the 
shooting of Clyde Bellecourt by fellow AIM member Carter Camp.
The details as to what precipitated the shooting have never been 
fully clarified, but it appears to have resulted from an argument 
over tactics. Whatever the motives behind Petite's words, 
neither Banks nor other AIM members publicly endorsed or 
acknowledged the statement.
In fact, Aaron Two Elk, a leading member of Iowa AIM, 
claimed later that Durham had issued the statement over Petite's 
signature. Two Elk claimed Durham was "always right out front, 
urging everybody to get it on. His thing was that if you didn't 
have continuous confrontations going on, you weren't really




serious,- that if we weren't engaged in confrontations, we 
couldn't generate any sort of progress for Indian people."36 
Two Elk offered nothing more than his word of honor for his 
statement. However, that is all Durham offered for most of his 
testimony. In addition, Two Elk's remarks more closely resemble 
the intent of an FBI operative, Durham, bent on proving AIM's 
violent tendencies. Eastland, though, accepted Petite's 
statement as further proof of AIM's inherently violent message.
Durham also produced a memo from Dennis Banks to be issued 
as a press release in December 1973. To protect against further 
dispossession of Indian lands, Banks encouraged tribes "to 
resist, by arms, if necessary."37 Banks and AIM wanted it known 
that they would not stand idly by if the government tried to take 
Indian lands as they had in the past. He did not encourage 
Indians to go looking for a fight or to assume the worst and 
shoot all reservation trespassers. However, he made it clear 
that Indians should not act as shrinking violets towards possible 
government land seizures. Banks repeated AIM's persistent 
theme - protection and recognition of those reservation lands 
still intact. However, the Subcommittee saw only the potential 
for violence.
Durham and Eastland failed to prove AIM inherently violent 
or communist-directed. In actuality, Durham's testimony revealed 
some points in AIM's favor. First, all of Durham's testimony
36Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression, p. 224.
37Revolutionarv Activities, p. 143.
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related to evidence in 1973 and 1974 - two years before the 
hearing. He did not address AIM's changed tactics. By 1974,
AIM's leadership had moved away from direct confrontation in the 
hopes of achieving recognition and satisfaction of grievances 
through legal and diplomatic channels. In fact, Durham decried 
the Declaration of Continuing Independence issued in the summer 
of 1974. He said the desire for tribal sovereignty, autonomy, 
and return of lands to be achieved through international 
diplomatic channels "clearly follows the old tactics of divide 
and conquer."38 Durham did not elaborate on who or what was to 
be divided and conquered. The Declaration simply addressed a 
desire to achieve recognition by the United States Government 
through the United Nations of past treaty claims. AIM did not 
want to conquer anyone.
Second, the press covered most of AIM's activities, goals, 
and plans. Many examples used by Durham to demonstrate AIM's 
violent tendencies were press releases by AIM or were provided by 
newspaper accounts of AIM's activities. AIM volunteered 
information to the press. If AIM had wanted to be known as a 
subversive, revolutionary group, it probably would have announced 
that to the press, also. It is more likely that AIM used the 
press as it always did - to gain and keep AIM in the spotlight by 
whatever means. AIM needed and wanted constant exposure. Its 
success in that area is due, in part, by shocking the press and 
public into listening. AIM's activities and statements did
38Ibid., p . 78 .
precisely that.
Finally, Durham introduced as evidence by-laws and policy 
programs for AIM. None of those documents mentioned the use of 
violence as a tool in achieving AIM's goals. Neither did they 
list political philosophies and doctrines. Those documents set 
guidelines concerning membership, organizational structure, and 
goals. While it is true that many organizations set goals and 
structures which they do not follow, it is unlikely that AIM 
would have produced detailed internal documents if they did not 
have credence.
All in all, Durham's testimony proved little. It did not 
prove that AIM had communist ties. It did not prove that AIM was 
fundamentally violent. It did not prove AIM wished to overthrow 
the Federal government. It did not prove AIM's guilt or 
innocence as a revolutionary group. However, Senator Eastland 
had already made up his mind. Eastland believed AIM was 
revolutionary and dangerous and that is what he found.
CONCLUSION
The American Indian Movement lost much of its support, 
voice, and importance by the end of 1976. Lengthy legal battles, 
an unresponsive media, nonacceptance by many reservation Indians, 
and government allegations contributed to AIM's downfall. No 
longer able to garner favorable media coverage, AIM's leadership 
had few ways to transmit its message.
In the face of such opposition, underlying internal 
divisions among AIM's leadership came to the surface. Some, such 
as Russell Means, preferred to maintain the group's radical and 
potentially violent posture. Others, such as Clyde and Vernon 
Bellecourt, pursued United Nations recognition of the 
International Indian Treaty Council and legal recognition of 
treaty claims. Frustrated by a nation, white and Indian, and a 
government that AIM considered unresponsive and uncaring, its 
leadership splintered.
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In addition, individual AIM chapters declined rapidly in 
number and influence after 1976. Internal power struggles, 
additional legal entanglements, fear of violent reactions from 
non-AIM Indians, and less radical, but new progressive tribal 
leadership destroyed most chapters. AIM members, nationally and 
locally, continued to decry racism and government abuses, but 
they lacked the strength AIM had given their words a few years 
earlier. As a national organization, AIM no longer existed.
AIM's demise was unfortunate. Despite AIM's militant and 
sometimes hostile posture, their activities spurred both Indians 
.and the government to action. Tribes examined their leadership 
and goals. Tribal Indians began to speak up for what they wanted 
and how they wanted to be governed. In South Dakota, the site of 
,many of AIM's activities, Robert Burnette and A1 Trimble both 
supporters of AIM, were elected chairman of their respective 
tribes, on the Rosebud and the Pine Ridge reservations, in the 
mid-1970's. They did not assume AIM's militant stance, but they 
did bring change.
AIM challenged the bonds of tribalism in asserting pan- 
Indianism. In so doing, AIM created a greater awareness among 
Indians of their tribalism. Indians began to question and 
explore the roots and extent of their tribal heritage in order to 
better understand their attitudes and feelings about their tribe 
and AIM. Many Indians realized that they did not know from 
whence they came or from where their loyalties sprang. AIM 
awakened an awareness that encouraged Indians to find themselves.
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Unfortunately for AIM, that, awakening led Indians, in many cases, 
away from AIM and closer to their tribes. As a consequence, 
Indians moved towards a greater sense of unity within their own 
communities in an effort to repair the rifts and divisions within 
each tribe. AIM sparked the renewal in Indian pride it had hoped 
for, but at the expense of its own interests.
Government action also increased in regard to the status and 
conditions of Indian life. In early 1975, Congress passed the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Act. The Act provided 
more money for Indian education and made it easier for tribes to 
assume control over education, health, and other programs 
formerly administered by the government, but under Federal 
compliance.1 Congress established the American Indian Policy 
review Commission in 1975. The Commission made 206 
recommendations for changes or clarifications in Federal Indian 
policy.2 For the most part, though, Congress implemented few 
changes.
Both of the above-mentioned measures sprang from the Wounded 
Knee Occupation hearings and its chairman, Senator James 
Abourezk. Abourezk, though not necessarily a supporter of AIM, 
saw the inequity and inefficiency of Federal Indian policy that 
AIM portrayed. AIM did not play a direct role in bringing about 
changes in Washington, D.C. and on the reservations. However,
lMU.S. Indians: On Legal Trail - And Winning," U.S. News and
World Report, May 26, 1975, p. 52-53.
2"Panel on U.S. Indian Policy Urges Tribes Be Recognized as 
Sovereign," New York Times, March 16, 1977, Section 4, p. 17.
AIM most certainly brought widespread attention to the plight of 
Indians in America. AIM's persistent and defiant stance forced 
lawmakers and Indians to look at what they did. Though not 
always accepted, AIM furthered the cause of self-pride and self- 
determination for Indians. As one AIM member put it, ”We were 
not angels. Some things were done by AIM, or rather by people 
who called themselves AIM, that I am not proud of. But AIM gave 
us a lift badly needed at the time. It defined our goals and 
expressed our innermost yearnings. It set a style for Indians to 
imitate.1,3
Many factors led to AIM's demise. Conflicts with tribal 
leaders, hostility from many reservation Indians, and a 
misunderstanding of tribal bonds and the nature, scope, and 
complexity of Indian law all contributed to AIM's problems in 
Indian country. AIM's often tenuous and inconsistent 
relationship with the media created confusion over AIM's goals 
and activities. That confusion also led to persistent attacks by 
the Federal government. The Internal Security Subcommittee, 
headed by Eastland, provided the culmination of the government's 
efforts. Eastland's hearing had little impact on an already 
crumbling AIM, but its findings symbolized the struggles AIM had 
faced. Eastland declared AIM dangerous and revolutionary; the 
same labels applied to AIM by other government agencies. The 
significance, however, of the Eastland's report can be found in 
its timing. Eastland's accusations gave the appearance of
3Crow Dog and Erdoes, Lakota Woman, p. 82.
79
contributing to AIM's downfall. In reality, the accusations 
simply coincided with AIM's demise and demonstrated the lengths 
to which certain government officials and agencies had gone to 
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APPENDIX B
OBJECTIVES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (1969)
We, the Concerned Indian Americans, residents of the Minneapolis 
area, organize to upgrade the condidtions in which the urban Indian 
lives, and to improve the image of the urban Indian.
We the Concerned Indian Americans, to be known as the American 
Indian Movement (A.I.M..), residents of the Minneapolis and greater 
Minneapolis area, do hereby adopt the following goals:
Our main objective is to solicit and broaden opportunities for the 
urban Indian in order that he may enjoy his full rights as a citizen 
of these United States.
SHORT RANGE OBJECTIVES
A. Establish a program to better the Indian housing problem.
B. Establish a program directed toward Indian youth.
C. Establish a positive program for employment of Indian Americans.
D. Establish a program to educate industry in the area of Indian
culture and its effect on the Indian.
E. Establish a program to improve the communications between the
Indian and the community.
F. Establish a program to educate the Indian citizen in his
responsibility to his community.
LONG RANGE OBJECTIVES
A. To generate unification within the Indian people.
B. To inform all Indian Americans of community and local affairs.
C. To encourage Indian Americans to become active in community
affairs.
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